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Abstract.  An intruder seeks to match a microdata file to an external file using 
a record linkage technique. The identification risk is defined as the probability 
that a match is correct. The nature of this probability and its estimation is 
explored. Some connections are made to the literature on disclosure risk based 
on the notion of population uniqueness.  
Keywords: identification; log-linear model; match; misclassification; 
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1   Introduction 
Statistical agencies are obliged to protect confidentiality when they release outputs. 
One potential threat to confidentiality is the use of record linkage methods [1, 2, 3]. 
The concern is that an ‘intruder’ might link an element of an agency’s output to a 
known individual (or other unit) in some external data source and, if the link is 
correct, succeed in identifying an individual who provided data upon which the output 
is based. Such identification (identity disclosure) might lead to the disclosure of 
further information about this individual.  
This threat is most natural to consider when the output consists of a microdata file. 
In this paper we suppose the agency releases a file containing records for a sample of 
units, with each record containing the values of various variables. These values may 
have been masked by statistical disclosure control (SDC) methods, although we 
suppose there remains a one to one correspondence between the records and the units 
which provided the data. Thus, identification of these units could, in principle, occur 
via record linkage to an external file of known units. We suppose that linkage takes 
place by matching the values of a subset of the variables, ‘key variables’, shared 
between the microdata and the external file.   
The main aim of this paper is to consider approaches to measuring and estimating 
the risk of identity disclosure in this setting. A secondary aim is to link this work with 
other approaches in the literature to assessing identification risk which have centred 
on concerns about the existence of ‘population uniques’, i.e. records which are unique 
in the population with respect to their values of the key variables.   
 Possibly the earliest contribution to assessing the identification risk arising from 
record linkage is by Spruill in [4]. She considers linkage methods which match by 
minimizing a distance measure and combines the definition of risk with the method 
for assessing it. The approach is based upon a re-identification experiment where each 
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record in a microdata file, which has been masked by an SDC method, is matched to 
the original unmasked file and the closest record in the latter file selected. The risk is 
defined essentially as the proportion of such matches which are correct.  She also 
notes that account might be taken of ‘near matches’. This broad approach has been 
adopted or discussed in much subsequent literature, e.g. [5, 1, 6, 7].      
There are, however, some problems with using the empirical proportion of correct 
matches as a measure of risk. First, the original unmasked file is acting as a surrogate 
for an external file held by the intruder in such approaches. The use of this file 
represents a highly conservative approach to risk assessment since it ignores the 
protective effect of sampling and, even if there are some common units in the 
microdata and external files, the values of the variables for these units in the two files 
are likely to differ for many practical reasons e.g. differences in measurement. To 
address this concern, the original unmasked file might be replaced by an alternative 
surrogate external file constructed by the agency. For example, it is reported in [8] 
that the US National Center for Education Statistics uses certain commercially 
available school files. Agencies may also consider using other datasets which they 
collect (from other surveys) or constructing synthetic files from the original unmasked 
file which take account of sampling and measurement error. 
A second more conceptual problem with this approach is that it can fail to reflect 
adequately the information available to the intruder. Suppose, for example, that the 
overall proportion of correct matches is 5% and that the agency considers this 
sufficiently low. Suppose, however, that the intruder could determine which 5% of his 
claimed matches are correct and which 95% are incorrect. Then the intruder could 
claim some matches with 100% confidence and this might be deemed an unacceptable 
disclosure risk. On the other hand, suppose the agency chooses to calculate its 
proportions separately according to different areas and observes that the proportions 
vary across areas from 0% to 70%. It might deem the release of data for those areas 
with proportions as high as 70% as unacceptable. However, if the intruder could only 
determine that the overall rate of a correct match was 5% (in practice, the intruder 
will have difficulty determining the proportion of correct matches since it requires 
knowledge of the true identities of the records in the microdata, information 
unavailable to the intruder) and was unable to identify areas where it was higher, the 
agency’s judgment would be over-conservative.  
In this paper we suppose that it is necessary for the intruder to have evidence that 
the link is ‘likely’ to be correct. Identification risk is defined as the probability that a 
match is correct, conditional on data assumed available to the intruder, c.f. [9, 10], 
and it is required that this probability can be estimated reliably from these data. We 
suppose that the agency might use empirical proportions of correct matches as a 
means of validating these estimates but not as a direct means of estimation.    
We focus in this paper on probabilistic record linkage methods (based on the 
approach of  Fellegi and Sunter in [11] (hereafter referred to as FS) rather than 
methods based on distance measures. These probabilistic methods are most naturally 
adapted to assess the probability of a correct match. Indeed, part of conventional 
record linkage methodology is the estimation of false match rates and one might, as a 
first approach, take one minus the estimated false match rate as a measure of 
identification risk. However, in conventional applications of record linkage, incorrect 
matches (false positives or false negatives) are only of interest because of their 
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statistical consequences for samples as a whole.  FS (p. 1196) state that ‘we are not 
concerned with the probability of [these two kinds of erroneous matches]…but rather 
with the proportion of occurrences of these two events in the long run’. In contrast, 
requirements to protect the confidentiality of every individual imply that an agency 
may be interested in the probability of a correct match for a single individual.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, a framework for the use of  record linkage 
for identification is set out in Section 2. Expressions for the probability of a correct 
match are obtained in Section 3. After briefly considering issues relating to key 
variables in Section 4, the estimation of the probability of a correct match is 
considered in Section 5. 
2  The Use of Record Linkage to Achieve Identification 
Consider a survey microdata file containing records for a sample of responding units 
1s  drawn from a finite population P . Each record will include variables needed by 
genuine users of the file, but is supposed not to include directly identifying variables 
like name and address. Suppose an intruder has access to this file and wishes to 
identify one or more units in 1s .  The intruder matches the file to an external file of 
records for another sample of units 2s P⊂ , for which the identities are known and 
for which it is feasible that the intersection 12 1 2s s s= ∩  is non-empty. (We assume 
that the definition of the population P  is public and that the intruder can thus remove 
any records in the external file which do not belong to P  – hence we do not need to 
allow for 1s  and 2s  to be drawn from different populations.)  
Suppose matching is based upon the values of variables, which appear in both files: 
the key variables [12].  Let  
a
X  denote the value of the vector of key variables for 
unit a  in the microdata ( 1a s∈ ) and bX  the corresponding value for unit b  in the 
external database ( 2b s∈ ). The difference in notation between X  and X allows for 
the possibility that the variables are recorded in a different way in the two data 
sources. This difference might arise from various reasons, including measurement 
error (in either source) or the application of a perturbative SDC method to the 
microdata file.  Following FS, suppose the intruder undertakes linkage by calculating 
a comparison vector ( , )
a bX Xγ   for pairs of units 1 2( , )a b s s∈ × , where the function 
(.,.)γ  takes values in some finite comparison space Γ . 
 
Example 1: Exact Matching on Categorical Key Variables  
Suppose X  and X  take only K  possible values, denoted {1,..., }K  without loss 
of generality. Let {1, 2,..., 1}KΓ = +  and define the comparison vector by 
( , )X X jγ =  if X X j= = , 1,2,...,j K= ,  ( , ) 1X X Kγ = +  otherwise.  In this case, 
an intruder might consider any pair 1 2( , )a b s s∈ ×  for which ( , )a bX X Kγ ≤  as a 
potential match, but rule out of consideration any pair for which ( , ) 1
a bX X Kγ = + . 
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Suppose the intruder seeks to use the comparison vectors to identify one or more 
pairs 1 2( , )a b s s∈ ×  which contain identical units, i.e. are of the form ( , )a a  where 
12a s∈ . Since the number of pairs in 1 2s s×  may be very large, the intruder may only 
consider pairs which fall in a set 1 2s s s⊂ × . Partition s  into   
12{( , ) | , }M a b s a b a s= ∈ = ∈ , the pairs of common units, and 
1 2{( , ) | , , }U a b s a s b s a b= ∈ ∈ ∈ ≠ , the pairs of different units. The problem faced 
by the intruder is how to use comparison vector values to classify pairs from s  into 
M or U . An optimum strategy is shown by FS to be based upon a comparison of the 
probability distributions of the comparison vector between M and U , i.e. a 
comparison of  
 
( ) Pr[ ( , ) | ( , ) ]
a bm X X a b Mγ γ γ= = ∈  ,         (1) 
 
  and ( ) Pr[ ( , ) | ( , ) ]
a bu X X a b Uγ γ γ= = ∈  , γ ∈ Γ .        (2) 
 
We discuss the nature of these probabilities in the next section. FS show that an 
optimal approach for the intruder is to order pairs in s  according to the likelihood 
ratios ( ) / ( )m uγ γ , treating pairs with higher values of this ratio as more likely to 
belong to M . Our aim is to explore the probability of a correct match for pairs 
selected in this way.  
3  The Probability of a Correct Match 
Given a pair ( , )a b , linked using its value of the comparison vector as described after 
(1) and (2), the probability that the pair represents a correct match, that is a b= ,  may 
be defined as  | Pr[( , ) | ( , )]M a bp a b M X Xγ γ= ∈  , i.e. the conditional probability that 
the pair is in M  given that it is in s  and that the comparison vector takes the value 
γ . To express |Mp γ  in terms of ( )m γ and ( )u γ , let: 
 
Pr[( , ) ]p a b M= ∈ ,      (3) 
 
be the probability that the pair is in M  given that it is in s  and, using Bayes 
theorem, we obtain 
 
| ( ) /[ ( ) ( )(1 )]Mp m p m p u pγ γ γ γ= + −   .                   (4) 
 
Sorting pairs according to this ‘posterior’ probability is equivalent to sorting 
according to the likelihood ratio ( ) / ( )m uγ γ . From the SDC perspective, expression 
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(4) may be interpreted as the identification risk for a pair ( , )a b , i.e. the probability 
that a  and b  are identical, given the value of the comparison vector. From the record 
linkage perspective, expression (4) is the probability of a correct match or 
alternatively one minus the probability of a false match [13].  
Expressions (1), (2) and (3) are, of course, dependent on the way the probabilities 
are defined. Our basic approach in this paper is to suppose that the probabilities are 
defined with respect to the following three processes: 
(i) a random selection (with equal probability) of  the pair ( , )a b  from s M U= ∪ ; 
(ii) a random process of generating 
a
X ; 
(iii) a specified probability design for the selection of 1s  from P ; 
where the population P and the values 
a
X  for units in the population are treated as 
fixed. Evaluating the probabilities over (i), holding 1s  and the aX  fixed, we may 
write   
 
( ) [ / ]M Mm E n nγγ =  , ( ) [ / ]U Uu E n nγγ =  ,   (5) 
 
where Mn and Un  are the numbers of pairs in M  and U respectively, Mn γ  and Un γ  
are the corresponding numbers of these pairs for which the comparison vector takes 
the value γ  and the expectation is with respect to (ii) and (iii). We may thus interpret 
( )m γ  and ( )u γ  as the expected relative frequencies of the different comparison 
vectors within  M  and U  respectively. Similarly, we may write  
 
( / )Mp E n n=  ,      (6) 
 
where n  is the number of pairs in s  and the expectation is with respect to (iii).  To 
explore the form of |Mp γ  further under (i), (ii) and (iii), consider two special cases. 
 
Example 1(continued) Exact matching  with no misclassification 
Suppose exact matching is used as defined earlier and that: 
a a
X X=  for all units 
a P∈  (i.e. no misclassification); 2s P=  and 1 2s s s= × .  Let 1 1| |n s=  and | |N P= . 
Noting that 1Mn n=  and 1n n N= , we obtain from (5) and (6): 
1( ) [ / ]jm j E f n=  ,        
1
  ( -1)  ( ) ( 1)
j jf F
u j E
n N
 
=  
− 
 ,  1,...,j K=  
           1 1[ /( )] 1/p E n n N N= = ,         (7) 
 
where jf  and jF  are the numbers of units with  aX j=  in 1s  and P  respectively.  
Using Bayes theorem we obtain:   
Pr[( , ) | ( , ) ] 1/
a b ja b M X X j Fγ∈ = =    .             (8) 
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This result if free of any assumptions about the sampling scheme. Expression (8) is 
familiar in the disclosure risk literature, e.g. [14]. It is common to argue, however, 
that agencies should design release strategies so that an intruder could not know the 
value of jF  from external information [10]. Note that, in particular, this requires 
assuming that 2s P≠ . Otherwise, the intruder could determine jF  from knowledge 
of 
a
X  for a P∈ . If jF  is unknown to the intruder, the uncertainty about  jF  needs 
to be integrated out of the expression for the identification risk, subject to 
conditioning on the information available to the intruder. This integration is most 
naturally done by revising the probability mechanisms (i)-(iii) above to include a 
process which generates the values 
a
X  for units in the population. Under this 
extended probability mechanism, the identification risk becomes (1/ | )jE F data , 
where data represents the data available to the intruder.  We shall return to this issue 
in Section 5. First, we extend the result in (8) to the case when 
a
X  may be derived 
from 
a
X  by a process of misclassification and 2s  may be any proper subset of P  .  
 
Example 1 (continued) Exact matching with misclassification 
Suppose again that exact matching is used and that 1 2s s s= × . We now allow 2s  to 
be any proper subset of P  and suppose that each 
a
X  is determined from 
a
X  as 
follows  
Pr( | )
a a jkX j X k θ= = =  , for all a P∈  ,         (9) 
where jkθ  is an element of a misclassification matrix with columns which sum to 1. 
We now obtain 
12
12( ) [ / ]jm j E f n=  ,  
12
j
1 2 12
   ( ) j jf f fu j E
n n n
 
−
=  
 
− 

,     1,...,j K=  
12 1 2[ /( )]p E n n n= , 
where 12jf  is the number of units in 12s  with aX j=  and aX j= ,  jf  is the number 
of units in 1s  with aX j=  and jf  is the number of units in 2s  with aX j=  . If we 
suppose that Bernoulli sampling is employed with inclusion probability pi  we have 
12 2 1 /n n n N  so that 1/p N  and 1 2 12 12( 1)n n n N n− − .  It follows that  
12
Pr[( , ) | ( , ) ] ja b
j j
f
a b M X X j E f fγ
 
∈ =  
 
 
 

 ,                       
where the expectation is with respect to both the sampling and the misclassification 
mechanisms. We have 12( )j jj jE f fpiθ=  and ( )j jE f Fpi=  ,  where jF  is the number 
of units in P  with 
a
X j=  (imagining that the misclassification takes place before 
the sampling). Hence we may write 
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Pr[( , ) | ( , ) ] jja b
j
a b M X X j
F
θ
γ∈ = 

 .     (10) 
Note that this expression applies for any choice of 2s , which may be selected 
arbitrarily. The expression in (4) for the probability of a correct match and the special 
cases in (8) and (10) apply to a pair of records ( , )a b  with a specific agreement 
pattern γ . This notion may be extended to apply to a class of pairs, ˆM , for which the 
likelihood ratio is above some threshold, say ˆ {( , ) | ( , ) }
a b MM a b X Xγ= ∈ Γ , where 
MΓ  is the set of agreement patterns γ  for which ( ) / ( )m uγ γ  is above a threshold 
specified by the intruder as determining which pairs to declare as links.   
A key issue for identification risk assessment is how to estimate |Mp γ and, more 
specifically, how to estimate , ( )p m γ  and ( )u γ . We discuss this in section 5. Before 
then, we consider the record linkage approach further. 
4 Taking Account of Key Variable Structure 
In practice it is usual to base the comparison vector ( , )
a bX Xγ   upon the separate 
comparisons of C  key variables. Letting 1( ,..., )CX X X=    and 1( ,..., )CX X X=  we 
write  
 
 
1 1 1( , ) [ ( , ),..., ( , )]C C C
a b a b a bX X X X X Xγ γ γ=   ,       (11) 
 
where ( , )c c cX Xγ   denotes the comparison vector for the cth  key variable.  
 
Example 2.  Comparison vectors for simple agreements between continuous or 
categorical key variables, c.f. [15] 
Let ( , ) 1c c cX Xγ =  if c cX X ∼  and ( , ) 0c c cX Xγ = , otherwise, 1,2,...,c C= , 
where ∼  is a specified agreement relation. Then  
1 2{( , ,..., ) | 0,1C cγ γ γ γΓ = = ; 1,2,..., }c C= {0,1}C=  and | | 2CΓ = . 
 
Example 3. Comparison vectors for agreements between categorical key variables 
Suppose cX  and cX  are categorical, taking values 1,2,...,c cj t= ,  and  
( , )c c c cX X jγ =  if c c cX X j= = , 1,2,...,c cj t= , ( , ) 1c c c cX X tγ = +  otherwise, 
1,2,...,c C= . Then 
 
1 2{( , ,..., ) | 1,..., 1, 1,2,..., }C c ct c Cγ γ γ γΓ = = + =  and 
1
| | ( 1)C c
c
t
=
Γ = +∏ . 
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Given the large potential size of Γ  when C  is at all large, it is common to restrict 
attention to a subspace  *Γ  of Γ . A common approach is to partition the set of 
possible values of a specified subset of the key variables into blocks (e.g. [16]) so that 
the intruder only examines pairs for matching for which the values of these key 
variables fall in the same block. This constraint is typically equivalent to restricting 
attention to a subspace *Γ  of Γ . 
The estimation of ( )m γ  and ( )u γ  is challenging if  | |Γ  is large, as is likely in 
Examples 2 and 3 if C  is at all large. It is therefore common to make simplifying 
assumptions, in particular, following FS, to treat the C  agreement patterns in (11) as 
independent within  M  and U , i.e.  
 
1 2
1 2( ) ( ) ( )... ( )CCm m m mγ γ γ γ=  and 1 21 2( ) ( ) ( )... ( )CCu u u uγ γ γ γ=       (12) 
 
where  ( ) Pr[ ( , ) | ( , ) ]c c c c c
c a bm X X a b Mγ γ γ= = ∈   and 
( ) Pr[ ( , ) | ( , ) ]c c c c c
c a bu X X a b Uγ γ γ= = ∈ , 1,2,...,c C= . We refer to this assumption 
as independence of agreement patterns. In the categorical variable case of Example 3 
with misclassification defined as in (9), a sufficient condition for the independence of 
agreement patterns is that misclassification operates independently, variable by 
variable, and that the key variables are themselves independent.   
5. Estimation 
In this section we consider the estimation of the probability of a correct match, |Mp γ , 
defined in section 3. We assume that the estimator is a function only of data which is 
available to the intruder and thus rule out the possibility of using a training sample, 
c.f. [13]. In this case, one approach would be to use a mixture model, where , ( )p m γ  
and ( )u γ  are treated as unknown parameters in a model for the observed values of 
the comparison vectors. The model is a mixture of models for M  and U , treated  as 
latent classes, and maximum likelihood estimation is used for parameter estimation 
(e.g. FS Method 2; [15, 17]). This modelling approach has found some success in 
record linkage applications where very strong identifying information, such as name 
and address, is available. On the other hand, it has been less successful when the 
distributions of the comparison vectors for M  and U  are not well-separated or are 
not each unimodal [15, 18] and this may be the case in practice in many SDC 
contexts, e.g. for social survey data. This is a matter for further empirical 
investigation, however, which we do not attempt in this paper.  
Instead, we approach the estimation problem more directly by considering 
expressions for |Mp γ in terms of our assumed probability mechanisms, as in section 3, 
and then considering how to estimate these expressions, from the data available to the 
intruder as well as possible additional external sources. This approach is analogous to 
Method 1 of FS. Since |Mp γ  is a function of , ( )p m γ  and ( )u γ , we also discuss the 
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problem of estimating these parameters to gain a better understanding of the general 
estimation problem. We first return to the two examples in Section 3.  
 
Example : Exact matching with no misclassification 
We obtained | 1/M jp Fγ =   in expression (8) but argued, following this expression, 
that a more suitable measure will usually be (1/ | )jE F data . The evaluation of this 
conditional expectation is discussed in [19] under the assumption that the jF  are 
generated from a Poisson log-linear model and that the sample frequencies jf  
represent the data. Treating the pairs ( , )j jf F  as independent, the conditional 
probability may then be expressed as (1/ | )j jE F f  and a closed form expression may 
be obtained under the Poisson log-linear model and a Bernoulli sampling assumption. 
The conditional probability will be highest for cases which are unique in the sample, 
i.e. 1jf = . The conditional probability may be estimated by estimating the log-linear 
model parameters and plugging these estimates into the expression for the conditional 
probability.  
 
Example 1: Exact matching  with misclassification 
We obtained the approximate expression | /M jj jp Fγ θ   in expression (10) . As 
above, we may argue that in practice jF  will be unknown and a more suitable 
measure is (1/ | )jj j jE F fθ  . The second component of this expression, (1/ | )j jE F f , 
may be estimated by applying the methodology of [19] to the observed microdata.  
The misclassification probability jjθ  might be estimated by making some 
approximating assumptions and using external evidence on the misclassification 
process. One assumption may be that some of the key variables are subject to no 
misclassification, as is commonly assumed for blocking variables, and that 
misclassification on the remaining variables is not dependent upon the values of such 
correctly classified variables. A further assumption may be that the remaining key 
variables are misclassified independently. This may be related to but is not the same 
as the earlier assumption of independence of agreement patterns. Under the 
independence of misclassification assumption,  jjθ  may be expressed as a product of 
correct classification probabilities for the different key variables.  This may need to be 
modified to allow for the possibility that the values of some key variables are missing.  
 
To better understand the nature of the general estimation problem, now consider 
the separate estimation of , ( )p m γ  and ( )u γ . Consider p  first. If n  is large we have 
from (6) that /Mp n n . The intruder knows the value of n  and so needs to estimate 
Mn  in order to estimate p . We know 12Mn n≤ , where 12 12| |n s= . And if we take the 
worst case, where the intruder selects s  in such a way that it includes all possible 
common pairs (i.e. all ( , )a a  where 12a s∈ ) then we have 12Mn n= . Thus, in order to 
estimate p , it suffices to estimate 12n . We suppose the intruder can determine 
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inclusion probabilities 1Pr( )i i spi = ∈  for 2i s∈ . This is plausible. Often inclusion 
probabilities are equal in social surveys or else they will vary by strata which may be 
known for units in 2s . Since we have 
2
12 ( )i
i s
n E pi
∈
= ∑ , where the expectation is with 
respect to the sampling scheme for 1s , the  intruder can estimate 12n  by 
2
12ˆ i
i s
n pi
∈
= ∑ and hence estimate p  by  12ˆ ˆ /p n n=  . Note also that some adjustment will 
usually be necessary for nonresponse (e.g. by multiplying ipi  by a response rate). 
Often in social surveys the inclusion probabilities ipi  will be small and so 12nˆ  is only 
likely to be to have reasonable relative precision as an estimator if the size of the 
external database is large, representing a substantial proportion of the population. The 
extent to which p  may be estimated reliably also, of course, depends upon this 
condition.  
Let us now turn to the estimation of ( )m γ  and ( )u γ . Consider Example 1 with 
misclassification again, where we wish to estimate ( )m γ  and ( )u γ  for 1,...,j K= . 
We may write 12 12( ) [ / ]jj jm j E n nθ= , where 12 jn  is the number of units in 12s  with 
jγ = . And under Bernoulli (or equal probability) sampling we may write 
12 12 2[ / ] /j jE n n f n= , so that 2( ) /jj jm j f nθ= . And to first approximation (Jaro, 1989) 
we have: 1 2( ) ( / )( / )j ju j f n f n . The right hand side of this expression provides an 
estimator of ( )u j  which should be reliable when jf  and jf  are not small. However, 
in many disclosure problems of interest this will not be the case. In these 
circumstances, a modelling approach such as using log-linear models [19] or the 
independence of agreement patterns approach in section 4 seems needed.  Note that to 
estimate |Mp γ  in (4) we only need to estimate the ratio ( ) / ( )m j u j , which we may 
approximate in this case by 1( ) / ( ) /( / )jj jm j u j f nθ=  . The factor 2/jf n  cancels out 
and the key unknown required to estimate ( )m j  is jjθ . We suggest that it will 
normally not be realistic to expect that the intruder will be able to estimate this 
parameter reliably from the available data (although the mixture model approach 
merits further investigation). Thus, we suggest that a more realistic approach is that it 
is estimated by making some approximating assumptions and using external evidence 
on the misclassification process, as discussed above. 
6 Conclusion 
This risk of identification may be defined as the probability of a correct match for 
attacks where the intruder uses record linkage. It has been shown that expressions for 
this probability may be obtained for probabilistic record linkage in some special 
cases. In particular, expressions for the probability in the case of categorical key 
variables have close connections to those in other literature on disclosure risk, such as 
 11 
[10]. It has also been shown that an intruder may be able to estimate these 
probabilities reliably under certain assumptions.  
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